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APPROACHING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
IN NEW MEXICO
Except for one notable contribution' a basic, overall approach to
statutory interpretation is not to be found in the various articles and
materials on the subject.2 This Note adopts the one exceptional approach (Hart and Sacks) and applies it to selected cases decided
by the New Mexico Supreme Court as presently constituted.3 While
the Hart and Sacks approach used here may seem simple and perhaps too obvious to waste the reader's time, it should be noted that
the New Mexico decisions, as do the decisions in most states, indicate a definite lack of any basic line of attack when confronted with
the problems of statutory interpretation.
This lack of approach in New Mexico does not necessarily mean
that most statutory interpretation decisions reach the wrong result.4
Indeed, many of the cases selected for analysis here reached the correct result, but for the wrong reasons. Consequently, the desired
certainty and predictability in the law are not furthered, and the
New Mexico attorney is not aided in analyzing his clients' problems
for the purpose of advising conduct or litigation.
All would agree that the importance of statutory interpretation
is increasing due to the ever increasing bulk of statutory law and,
hence, cases calling for interpretation of statutes. What, then, is
this intriguing approach that will end all our problems of construction? Hart and Sacks state that in interpreting a statute a court
should:
1. Decide what purpose 5 ought to be attributed to the statute and

to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so
as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that
it does not give the words either1. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 1144-417 (Tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Sacks]. A
summary of their approach can be found at 1410-17.
2. A short bibliography can be found in Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1147-48.
For a more comprehensive bibliography see Sanders & Wade, Legal Writings on
Statutory Construction,3 Vand. L. Rev. 569 (1950).
3. The New Mexico Supreme Court has retained its present membership, with one
exception, since August 1, 1960. The justices are David W. Carmody, James C.
Compton, Irwin S. Moise M.E. Noble, and recently elected Paul Tackett.
4. This Note in no way attempts to present statistics on right versus wrong results
according to the Hart and Sacks approach.
5. For a criticism of the purpose approach see Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 863, 875-78 (1930).
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a meaning they will not bear, or

(b) a meaning which would violate any established policy of
clear statement.0
The basis of this formulation is that every statute is, of necessity,
a purposive act, and that no statute can be properly interpreted
without considering the purpose which ought to be attributed to it.
It does not say that the court's function is to acertain the intent of
the legislature with respect to the particular matter at hand.7 The
court is bound by the words used together with relevant elements
of the context, in the broad sense, and cannot give effect to a particular
known intention of the legislature that conflicts with the general
and subordinate purposes of the statute as written.8 Attributing
purpose to the words of the statute and carrying out that purpose to
the matter at hand, then, is the court's function.
The first words that a court should examine are those of a general statement of purpose found in the statute itself. This statement
should be accepted, however, only if it "appears to have been designed to serve as a guide to interpretation, is consistent with the
words and context of the statute, and is relevant to the question of
meaning at issue." 9 Such a statement being absent, however, the
court must infer purpose according to the words as written in the
immediate context and certain relevant extrinsic aids.
First, the court should assume, "unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."' 0 Then the court should
6. Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1200, 1411. Hart and Sacks explain what can be
expected of a theory of statutory construction:
When an effort is made to formulate a sound and workable theory . . .
the most that can be hoped for is that it will have some foundation in experience and in the best practice of the wisest judges, and that it will be well
calculated to serve the ultimate purposes of law.
Id. at 1201.
7. See text accompanying note 12 infra. Courts often speak of "intention" when
they mean "purpose." Since appellate courts usually handle difficult problems of statutory construction rather than easy ones to which a statute unquestionably applies, how
likely is it that the legislative body which enacted the statute had any "intention" as
to the particular fact situation in issue? The legislature is likely to have actually considered only a few of the infinite number of situations which could possibly arise under
a statute.
8. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1157:
(b) The general words of a statute ought never to be read as directing an
irrational pattern of particular applications. (c) What constitutes an irrational
pattern of particular applications ought always to be judged in the light of
the overriding and organizing purpose.
9. Id. at 1413.
10. Id. at 1415.

OcTOBER 1968]

STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION

use the technique of purpose set forth in Heydon's Case" in 1584
which essentially compares the new law to the old. In other words,
the court is to look at the "mischief" existing in the law prior to enactment and at the reason for the remedy provided in the statute.
Third, the court should hypothesize instances of "unquestioned application of the statute" to which the issue at hand may be analogized.
If substantial doubt still exists in the interpreter's mind, then certain outside contextual aids may be used: development of the prior
law, general public knowledge about the mischief that was thought
to require a remedy, public announcements of officials directly involved in the process of enactment (e.g., governor, committee reports), and internal legislative history. As to the use of legislative
history, however, Hart and Sacks point out two important limitations:
First. The history should be examined for the light it throws on
general purpose. Evidence of specific intention with respect to particular applications is competent only to the extent that the particular
applications illuminate the general purpose and are consistent with
other evidence of it.
Second. Effect should not be given to evidence from internal legis-

lative history if the result would be to contradict a purpose otherwise indicated and to yield an interpretation disadvantageous to pri2
vate persons who had no reasonable means of access to the history.'
11. 30 Co. 7a (K.B. 1584). The formula can be found in Hart & Sacks, supra
note 1, at 1144, and Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737,
757 (1940):

[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes .
be discerned and considered:

.

. four things are to

1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did

not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth.
4th. The true reason of the remedy.
And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as
and to add force
shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy ...

and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers
of the Act....
12. Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1416. The federal courts and a few state courts
are looking more to extrinsic aids as guides to the interpretation of statutes. Jones,
Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 Col. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1940). And many
law review articles advocate the use of such aids. Contra, Radin, supra note 5, at
872-73. It must be remembered that such aids are not substitutes for the purpose
approach:
Consider the difference between going to the legislative history with a
question about general purpose carefully formulated after analysis of the
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The use of committee reports and internal legislative history is
strictly limited in New Mexico, however, as in most other states, because of a lack of publication. Indeed, it is a rare statute that has a
written history. Thus, in New Mexico the court will usually have to
rely exclusively on the statute itself.
Also to be considered in inferring purpose are post-enactment
aids. Popular construction of a statute 3 plus the court's own prior
interpretations of it are relevant in attributing purpose.
After inferring purpose, the court should attempt to carry out
that purpose without giving the words of the statute "a meaning
they will not bear," or "a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear statement."' 4 The first proposition or prohibition will always operate, if at all, to prevent expansion of the scope
of a statute. Legislatures must necessarily use the imperfect vehicle
of written language to communicate general authoritative directions
which in every case require interpretation. The courts are bound by
the statutes as written and they cannot give effect to unenacted purpose or intention. Thus, this requirement that words must bear the
meaning given them may work to defeat actual legislative intention.
The meaning of words depends upon context, and courts need to be
"linguistically wise."' " Dictionaries can be of help in determining
the boundary lines to the meanings of words. Maxims of construction, such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, may also be useful
as simple devices for checking a certain result to insure that the
words of a statute have not been given a meaning they will not bear.
This use of maxims of construction should not be confused with
their usual incorrect use in state courts as substitutes for interpretation. The usual use of maxims is incorrect for two reasons. The
first is that maxims are not in fact substitutes for interpretation, but
mere labels that are attached to the results of some interpretative
process which has already taken place but which remains unrelated
and obscure. Professor Radin ably pointed out this objection while
considering the plain meaning rule:
statute and the rest of its context, and plunging into the morass of successive

versions of the bill, committee hearings, committee reports, floor debates, and
conference reports with a blank mind waiting to be instructed, on the assumption that it is equally probable that the legislature did or did not "intend" a
particular result and trying to find out which.
Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1264.

13. Court opinions seldom discuss the popular construction of statutes. Hart &
Sacks, supra note 1, at 1164.

14. See quotation in text accompanying note 6 supra.
15. Most words have several meanings, not just one. The way to determine which
meaning is the correct one is by reference to the context. And an essential element of
the context of every statute is its purpose.
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As a matter of fact, in most cases when courts say that a statute is
plain and therefore needs no interpretation, they do so in the inverted
fashion which marks so much of the judicial process. They have
already interpreted, and they then declare that so interpreted the statute
needs no further interpretation.' 6

The second objection that can be made to this use of maxims of
construction is the fact that in doing so a court forces these rules
upon the legislature and thereby acts outside its judicial authority.
It is a popular, and perhaps accurate, notion that legislatures enact
statutes because of prior experience with
poorly worded, redundant
7
interpretation disasters.1
The Hart and Sacks approach also prohibits interpreting a statute
by giving the words "a meaning which would violate any established
policy of clear statement.' 8 Again actual legislative intent may be
defeated, and a linguistically permissible meaning of statutory
words may require avoidance because of other policies which Hart
and Sacks consider to be "constitutionally imposed. The policies
have been judicially developed to promote objectives of the legal
system which transcend the wishes of any particular session of the
legislature."' 9
In general, the requirement of clearness will vary according to
whom the statute is addressed. Thus, the need for clarity is greater
when the words are addressed to private persons than to, say,
judges. One particular policy of clear statement is pointed out.
"[W]ords which mark the boundary between criminal and noncriminal conduct should speak with more than ordinary clearness.
This policy has special force when the conduct on the safe side of the
line is not, in the general understanding of the community, morally
blameworthy. 20
So completes a summary of the Hart and Sacks approach. Before
the cases can be considered, however, there remains one possible
stumbling block to a summary application of this formulation in
16. Radin, supra note 5, at 869. This usual use of maxims has been widely dis-

credited by writers. Contra, Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation", 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 886, 892 (1930). Courts must not be entirely unaware of the problems of their
use, however, because often maxims are ignored or stated and carefully avoided. One
interesting point is that for every rule of construction there is an opposite rule that
can be argued. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
17. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has also found it necessary to sprinkle its
decisions with maxims of construction. One need only consult the New Mexico digest
to discover the numerous cases in which such maxims were used.
18. See quotation in text accompanying note 6 supra.
19. Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 1413.
20. Id. at 1413, 1240-41.
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New Mexico. New Mexico has found it necessary to enact a statutory interpretation statute 121
In the construction of constitutional and statutory provisions the
following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to
the context of the constitutional provision or statute:
First. Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language .... 22
The remaining rules (2 through 8) in the statute refer to particular
situations and may be ignored in this discussion.23 The question
arises, however, to what extent, if any, this statute prohibits the use
of the Hart and Sacks theory of statutory interpretation developed
above. Perhaps the statute compels the use of this or similar theory.
How does one go about interpreting a statutory construction statute?24 May one approach be used to reach a result which would
compel the use of another approach thereafter ?2
The first rule of the statute reads in part: "Words and phrases
shall be constructed according to the context. . . ." Is this legislative direction inconsistent with the Hart and Sacks approach? Probably not. An important element of context is purpose. The only
remaining problem is whether the word "context" is limited to the
four corners of the statute or whether it refers also to extrinsic aids
such as legislative history or even to the prior "mischief" that required a statutory remedy. Shouldn't we assume that because statutes are purposive acts the legislature would not reasonably limit
the court's ability to discover purpose? If so then, so far, the statutory construction statute not only is consistent with the Hart and
Sacks approach, but also directs the court to follow a purposive
approach whether it be identical to theirs or not.
The second part of the first rule-"Words and phrases shall be
construed according to . . . the approved usage of the language"
-seems to fit in perfectly with the Hart and Sacks theory. This lan21. Why should this statute be necessary?
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-2-2 (Supp. 1967).
23. It is interesting to note that the particular rules were probably adopted to
avoid stilted judicial interpretation. The word "may" is used in four of the seven
remaining rules to prevent the court from arriving at unintended results. For example,
"words importing the singular number may be extended to several persons or
things. .... "
24. The first rule of interpretation not only has never been construed by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, it has never even been cited.
25. This problem is not unlike the one presented by the rule-"Every generalization has an exception"-which is itself a generalization.
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guage does not direct the court to give every word a single meaning
nor a common meaning necessarily, but directs the court to follow
the path of choosing meanings for words within certain linguistically
permissible limits. In other words, has not the legislature directed
the court to refrain from giving words "a meaning they will not
bear ?"126
The only limit placed upon the first general rule is that any resulting construction should apply "unless such construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant
to the context of the . . . statute." It would seem that this limitation applies to the other seven specific rules of construction rather
that the first because if the first has been properly followed then the
limitation of meeting legislative "intention" must necessarily have
been met. This redundancy with regard to the first rule is further
exemplified by the repeated reference to "context."
Of course, the redundancy disappears if we consider the word
"intent" to mean something other than purpose, i.e., the wishes of the
legislature with regard to particular fact situations. That we should
not so interpret the term becomes evident after two important considerations. First, the limitation would seldom, if ever, apply because
it would be the rare instance in New Mexico when the court could
discover the actual intent of the legislature with respect to a particular situation. Moreover, the legislature, of necessity, could only
contemplate a limited number of specific situations when the act was
passed. Second, even if the legislative intent were discoverable, then
that intent could not be given effect contrary to the ascertained purpose without producing inconsistent results. Should we assume that
a reasonable legislature would desire such irrationality in the law?
The New Mexico statutory construction statute, therefore, is not
inconsistent with the theory formulated by Hart and Sacks. Perhaps
the analysis was weighted in favor of the result reached, but as far
as this Note is concerned the New Mexico statute shall not constitute
a barrier to the application of the Hart and Sacks approach to the
New Mexico cases.
The cases selected for discussion may seem somewhat limited in
value. Cases that involve statutes as part of general codes have been
excluded in order to avoid the problems and added policies connected with the interpretation of such statutes in light of the purposes of other provisions and of the code as a whole. For the most
part cases that involve isolated statutes have been selected. Similarly,
26. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
27. See note 8 supra.
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in order to avoid added problems of stare decisis,2s only cases construing statutes for the first time have been chosen. The limitations
on the kind of cases selected will not, it is hoped, impair the value
of demonstrating a workable theory of interpretation.
The first example case to be considered, State v. Peters,2 9 involved
the following criminal statute:
Any person confined in the state penitentiary who shall escape or
attempt to escape therefrom shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not
less than two [2] years, which sentence shall not30run concurrently
with any other sentence such person then be serving.
The interpretation problem arose because the defendant had escaped
from a prison honor farm rather than from the state security prison
located outside Santa Fe. The issue before the court was whether
the term "penitentiary" included the prison honor farm. The New
Mexico court answered the question in the affirmative; but used a
short approach which in no way resembled a purpose approach. The
court examined another New Mexico statute 31 and determined that
it compelled the result reached in the case. That statute provides for
the management and general government of the penal institutions,
prisons farms as well as the security prison, to be placed in the hands
of a single commission. The court reasoned from this statute that
"the prison honor farm is an integral part and parcel of the state
penitentiary, and
escape therefrom is an escape from the state
'3 2
penitentiary.
The fallacy in this approach ought to be apparent. The decision
by the legislature concerning the administrative structure depended
upon policies (e.g., efficiency) which are irrelevant to the policies
governing the deterrence of escape from different kinds of penal
institutions. Is it reasonable to assume that the purpose of the administrative act has any relation to the purpose of the criminal
escape act? Indeed, had the New Mexico legislature found it convenient to establish separate commissions for the different institutions, would the New Mexico court have felt compelled to construe
"escape from the penitentiary" as necessarily excluding escape from
a prison honor farm?
28. For an interesting analysis of stare decisis see Hart & Sacks, rupra note 1, at
565-651.
29. 69 N.M. 302, 366 P.2d 148 (1961).

30. N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 143, § 1 (repealed 1963).
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. §42-1-1 (Repl. 1964).
32. State v. Peters, 69 N.M. 302, 304-05, 366 P.2d 148, 150 (1961).
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The question now is whether the court reached the correct result
regardless of its peculiar reasoning.13 What purpose ought to be
attributed to the escape statute? Surely the primary purpose is that
of deterrence, as in all criminal statutes. Why, then, would the legislature distinguish, for purpose of deterrence, between an escaper
from the security prison (to whom the statute unquestionably applies) and one from the prison farm? It is unlikely that the legislature considered the problem of escape from the prison farm or had
any intent in regard to that particular situation. By way of analogy,
however, the importance of deterring the honor farm escaper is
equal to that of deterring the security prison escaper, i.e., reinforcement of the deterrent factor connected with the original criminal
act, protection of society from a repetition of the criminal acts until
rehabilitation is accomplished, costs of re-apprehending the escaper,
and the immediate dangers involved in the escape itself (though,
perhaps, somewhat less on a prison farm). The analogy having been
made, then, it would be irrational according to the purpose of deterrence to apply the escape statute to escapers from the security prison
and not to those from the honor farm.
Defendant asserted that he had been prosecuted under the wrong
statute, that he should have been charged under another which prohibited escape from custody while under criminal sentence, "though
not actually within the confines of the penitentiary. ' '3 4 The sentence
for escape under this statute was identical to that provided in the
statute under which he was convicted. The same kind of interpretation problem would have been involved because the legislature was
unlikely to have thought of the prison honor farm, but rather escape
from the time of conviction until delivery to the security prison.
Nevertheless, this statute, rather than helping defendant, reinforces
his conviction because the two statutes together indicate a general
legislative purpose to "cover the field."
The only problem remaining is Hart and Sacks' second prohibition, i.e., the meaning attributed to "penitentiary" must not violate
any policy of clear statement. The applicable policy is that criminal
statutes should be extraordinarily clear in order to ensure that the
addressees are properly notified. In this case, however, the defendant could hardly claim surprise. Being confined in a minimum security institution could not have led him to believe that he was free to
choose confinement or freedom, even though the opportunities for
escape were greater.
33. The court also cites cases from other states, an idea that is criticised in the
analysis of another case. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
34. N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 143, § 2 (repealed 1963).
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The New Mexico court reached the correct result, but for the
wrong reasons.8 5 In State v. Weddle"8 the court reached the wrong
result. The case involved the distribution of appellate jurisdiction.
In order to relieve the New Mexico Supreme Court of its intolerable
case load, the New Mexico legislature created a court of appeals,
and at the same time defined the appellate jurisdiction of the new
court. Four main areas of appellate jurisdiction were provided,
one being
C. criminal actions except those in which a judgment of the district
court imposes a sentence of death or life imprisonment; . . .

The court also provided that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court "extends to all cases where appellate38 jurisdiction is not
specifically vested by law in the court of appeals.
The question in the Weddle case was whether jurisdiction of an
appeal of a determination on a Rule 93 motion belongs to the New
Mexico Supreme Court or the New Mexico Court of Appeals."' The
only possible basis for jurisdiction in the court of appeals would be
section 16-7-8 (C) (criminal actions) quoted above. The court held
that such appeals do not fall within 16-7-8(C). Again the court
failed to adopt a purposive approach. The court reasoned that because Rule 93 was copied from 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1964) and because
the federal courts had concluded that §2255 proceedings are civil,
actions under Rule 93 should be considered to be civil. The court
then added:
Having so concluded, is it still possible to bring the proceeding within the terms of §16-7-8(C), supra? That it is not, would seem to be
35. In 1963 the New Mexico legislature repealed the escape statute and enacted
a new provision:
Escape from penitentiary consists of any person who shall have been lawfully
committed to the state penitentiary:
A. escaping or attempting to escape from such penitentiary; or
B. escaping or attempting to escape from any other lawful place of custody
or confinement and although not actually within the confines of the
penitentiary ...
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-22-9 (Repl. 1964).
36. 77 N.M. 420, 423 P.2d 611 (1967).

37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-8 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-14 (Supp. 1967).
39. Interestingly, the legislature also passed a unique statute designed to prevent
either appellate court from wasting time on questions concerning the distribution of appellate jurisdiction. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-10 (Supp. 1967). Whether or not the New
Mexico Supreme Court could properly entertain the issue in accordance with this
provision, the case still presents an interesting statutory interpretation question.
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obvious. We see no language of the legislature that could be considered to be ambiguous in this regard, so as to present a question of
interpretation. We only enter upon a process of interpretation when
language of a statute is ambiguous, 40 and to ascertain legislative intent. . . . We see nothing in words used by the legislature which
can remotely be considered to have contemplated appeals under Rule
93 as appeals in "criminal actions" as that term is used in §16-7-8 (C),
41
supra.

The best that can be said for the court's reasoning is that it is largely
irrelevant. 42 The fact that the federal courts have labeled the §2255
proceedings as civil for purposes apart from the interpretation of
jurisdictional distribution statutes should not serve as such as interpretation of New Mexico's jurisdiction statute. Is it improper to
treat Rule 93 motions as civil for some purposes, yet criminal for
others? Should the indiscriminate use of labels serve as a substitute
for the proper analysis of purposes? Surely illogical inflexibility does

not promote the ultimate purposes of law or public confidence in the
judiciary.
Ought §16-7-8 (C) to be considered to include appeals from determinations of Rule 93 motions? The court found "nothing in words
used by the legislature which [could] remotely be considered to have
contemplated [such] appeals." That conclusion is unsupported by
reasoning in the court's written opinion.
The legislature in attempting to reduce the case load of the supreme court enacted broad provisions for the distribution of jurisdiction. It is doubtful that the legislature considered very many
particular instances of application, much less Rule 93 motions. The
general subsection (C) relating to criminal actions would seem to
indicate the inclusion of Rule 93 motions, not their exclusion. These
motions arise from criminal actions regardless of how they are
labeled. Is it reasonable to assume that the purpose of having the
court of appeals handle direct criminal appeals precludes that court
from taking appeals on motions that arise out of criminal actions?
There is nothing to indicate that the legislature distinguished the two
situations in terms of the purpose of the act to distribute the case
load between the two courts.
Thus, the court reached the wrong result because of its failure
40. Is this the plain meaning rule? See text accompanying notes 14-17 rupra.
41. State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420, 423-24, 423 P.2d 611, 614- (1967).
42. The dissent also dealt with the same kind of irrelevancies, although on that
plane several good arguments were made. The majority opinion, however, failed to
answer the points raised by the dissent.
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to consider legislative purpose. 43 Some cases, however, indicate
that the court is not completely unaware of such an approach, although purpose could have been examined more carefully. State v.
Schwartz** involved the following statute which was passed in addition to several criminal statutes prohibiting gambling:
All persons who shall claim money or property lost at gaming, or
when said money or property may be claimed by his wife, child, relation, or friend, said person, although he may have gambled, is hereby
exempted from the punishment imposed by the laws prohibiting and
45

restraining gaming.

The defendants were all arrested and charged under the criminal
gambling statutes. Before trial each one instituted a civil action
against all the others for recovery of gambling losses. They then
argued that the charges ought to be dismissed by virtue of the above
provision. The trial court denied the motion and the supreme court
was no more sympathetic to the defense.
The court reasoned that the provision in question as well as the
others in the same article were "designed" to deter gambling. If the
defendants were allowed sanctuary under the provision, then gambling would be encouraged instead of discouraged. Defendants must
come forward with their civil suits before being charged in order to
take advantage of the immunity;
"otherwise the whole purpose of
' 46
the act would be defeated.
The court, because of the rather interesting and novel argument
of the defense, was forced to resort to some analysis of purpose.
While the purpose approach led to the correct result, the court
failed to complete the analysis. Surely the initial purpose of the
provision is to deter gambling. A potential gambler faces the risk
that he will be unable to enforce his claim for winnings or the risk
that, if paid, his winnings are subject to recovery by the loser. The
problem is that the statute is actually brought into play only after
43. The statute distributing areas of jurisdiction to the court of appeals was
amended subsequent to the decision. The following addition was made: "the court has
jurisdiction to review on appeal: . . .D. post-conviction remedy proceedings except
where the sentence involved is death or life imprisonment." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-8
(Supp. 1967). If the court continues to approach this statute in the same manner, the
legislature may be forced to waste more of its time on corrective amendments.
Legislative reaction to a statutory interpretation decision, however, is not necessarily an indication that the court misinterpreted a statute. The interpreting court cannot give effect to unenacted intent or purpose. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
44-. 70 N.M. 436, 374 P.2d 418 (1962).
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-10-14 (1953). Other sections give the loser and others
a right of action against the winner for the amount lost. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-10-1,
-3,-12 (1953).
46. State v. Schwartz, 70 N.M. 436, 438, 374 P.2d 418, 420 (1962).
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it has failed to deter. In such a situation is the provision designed
to obtain informers, as the court suggests ? 7 If so, why do only
losers receive the exemption, but not winners who cannot sue for
losses? 48 Moreover, if the informer argument is valid then the
critical element for a case such as this would not be whether the loser
has been criminally charged, but whether the person against whom
he claims has been charged. Thus, a loser who has been charged
would still be able to escape liability by bringing suit against his
winner (informing) up to the time when the winner is charged.
The informer argument is apparently fallacious. The statute is
more likely designed to encourage private enforcement by immunizing a civil plaintiff against criminal prosecution. The loser cancels the
criminal "evil" which has already taken place.4" If this analysis is
accurate then the critical element would not be whether the winner
has been criminally charged, but whether the loser has been charged.
If the winner has been charged there is still a need to lure the loser
into the open by means of the immunity so that the criminal "evil"
can be erased. On the other hand, once the loser has been charged
he is already out in the open and still able to bring his civil action
against the winner; the reason to grant him immunity has disappeared. This inapplicability of the policy of the statute together
with other policies which the court mentions"0 serves to completely
undermine the argument of the defendants.
The failure of the court to thoroughly examine the statutory
problem limits the value of the decision as solid precedent. The
opinion fails to indicate whether the critical element of being
charged lies with the winner or loser. Time and litigation expense
will likely be wasted in the future to resolve questions which a
proper decision would have answered, or at least indicated an answer by making possible reasoned analogies. 5 '
47. "The statute imposes a duty upon one invoking it. It requires him to come
forward, disclose and make known the criminal act by the filing of a civil action for
recovery of his losses." Id. (emphasis added).
48. The informer argument would be more persuasive if there were other informer
provisions.
49. The indirect effect, which adds to the initial deterrent purpose, is the obtaining
of informers, but this is not the primary policy. Also, while the statute has failed to
deter the parties to the civil action, it serves to deter others in the future as it reestablishes the monetary status quo.
50. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
51. The state also made the argument that the criminal acts repealed by implication the prior enacted immunity statute. The court answered this contention with:
We find no merit in the position of . . . the appellee. There is no inconsistency in the intent, purpose, or applicability of the two acts.
State v. Schwartz, 70 N.M. 436, 438, 374 P.2d 418, 419 (1962). Had the purposes of
the two different kinds of acts been carefully examined, a more satisfactory explanation might not have been so difficult to verbalize.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

In Hensley v. State Board of Education 2 the correct result was
again reached, but the court's reasoning was rather inadequate. Appellee had been employed as a teacher in the Forrest school district
(Quay County) for four consecutive years and had been given notice of re-employment for the fifth consecutive year, 1960-61.
Shortly thereafter the State Board of Education ordered the consolidation of the Forrest and Melrose districts, and appellee was
employed by the consolidated district for the school year 1960-61.
In the spring, however, she was notified by the governing board that
she was dismissed from her position for the school year 1961-62.
She "requested a hearing and appeared before the governing board
of the consolidated district but that board refused to recognize appellee as a tenure teacher and refused to grant her a hearing as
provided by statute for a tenure teacher before dismissing her, and
retained non-tenure teachers in the school districts. ' 5 3 The applicable
statute reads in part:
A. On or before the closing day of each school year . . . the governing board of each school district in the state . . . shall serve
written notice of reemployment of or dismissal upon each teacher by
it then employed, certified as qualified to teach by the . . . state
board of education ....
B. The notice of dismissal required under subsection A of this section to a certified teacher who has taught in a particular county or
other particular administrative school unit for three (3) consecutive
years and holds a contract for the completion of a fourth consecutive
year in a particular district shall specify a place and date for a hearing not less than five (5) days nor more than ten (10) days from the
date of service of such notice at which time the teacher may
appear ....54

Appellee appealed the decision of the governing board to the
State Board, which ruled that she did not have tenure because she
had not taught in the consolidated district for three successive years
with a contract for the fourth.
The supreme court upheld appellee's right to tenure for two
"reasons." One was that since the consolidated district was a continuation of the old districts, "it follows, therefore, that the newly
consolidated district was the 'particular district' in which appellee
earned tenure." 55 The second was as follows:
52.
53.
54.
55.

71 N.M. 182, 376 P.2d 968 (1962).
Id. at 183-84, 376 P.2d at 969.
N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 71, § 1 (repealed 1967).
Hensley v. Board of Educ., 71 N.M. 182, 185, 376 P.2d 968, 970 (1962).
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We do not find, nor think the legislature intended, that a new designature of name or a different governing board destroys the actual
existence of the "particular" districts which merged to form the56consolidated district insofar as the acquisition of tenure is concerned.

The first reason given by the court is not a reason at all, but
merely a restatement of the central question, namely, whether a
consolidated district ought to be considered to continue the old
districts for purposes of tenure. The second reason merely states
a belief as to the intent of the legislature. Yet, how likely is it that
the legislature considered this particular problem? Even if such
an intent was formed, it is unlikely that the court found evidence of
it outside of the purpose of the tenure statute.
What purpose ought to be attributed to that statute? Surely it is
designed to provide job security for teachers who have proven their
worth to the school system and have gained valuable experience in
the process. 5 7 The initial three year period is a trial period during
which a teacher may be discarded for much less cause than one who
has tenure. And in the situation of teacher reduction, tenure teachers
are retained while non-tenure teachers are not.58 On the other hand,
the statute is so worded as to prevent a teacher from carrying his
tenure to another school district. Now why would a reasonable legislature want to do that? Is it not because that, while the state certification standards may apply uniformly throughout the state, the
standards above the minimum may vary from district to district because of simple supply and demand? Therefore, a district with
higher standards should not be compelled to employ a teacher, with
tenure from a district with lower standards, who might not have
originally been accepted, or indeed, had previously been rejected.5 9
Another purpose may be to discourage teachers from moving to new
districts, thus insuring certainty of personnel from year to year.
Accepting these to be the purposes of preventing the transporting
of tenure and considering the original purpose of tenure, what result
do they indicate in the case of consolidation of school districts? The
answer to this question is more complicated than in the cases con56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. The reason given for appellee's dismissal, i.e., a reduction in the teaching staff,
without more, would not appear to be a good and sufficient reason for the dismissal of
a tenure teacher when other teachers without tenure are retained in her place and
stead. Id.
59. This of course assumes that the district to which the teacher is transferring has
non-tenure teachers. See note 58 supra. Otherwise, the higher standard might very
well constitute good cause for non-retention.
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sidered so far because of the problems presented by dual purpose.
On the one hand, the purpose of tenure (i.e., providing job security for experienced teachers) would be defeated if tenure were to
be eliminated by consolidation, because if one teacher is to lose his
tenure then, to be consistent, all teachers from both districts must
lose their tenure. Moreover, while maintaining tenure would reinforce the purpose of deterring teacher mobility, the removal of
tenure would seriously undermine that purpose. On the other hand,
assuming a reduction in teaching staff is indicated ° and assuming
that the two districts in question have different standards for the
employment of teachers, the removal of tenure would allow the
better qualified teachers to be retained.
How is this conflict of purposes to be resolved? The court must
balance the relative effect of the alternative results on the purposes
of the statute. In this case there is a lack of evidence to support a
definite conclusion, but it is likely that the balance would weigh
heavily in favor of retaining tenure. The profound effect of loss of
tenure on the purposes of job security for other districts because
of fear of consolidation and deterrence of teacher mobility far outweighs the effect of tenure retention on the need for teacher reduction, which is a problem only when the two districts have unequal
employment standards. The court should look more closely to the
actual effect on purposes that would occur in a particular consolidation case. It would be a most unusual case, however, that would upset the balance that favors the retention of tenure.
In the Hensley case the court resorted to legislative "intent." The
intent of the legislature regarding a certain set of circumstances may
be useful as an indication of the purpose that ought to be attributed
to a particular statute,6 ' but this intent is not only difficult to discover in New Mexico, but may have been impossible for the legislature to form at the time of enactment. For example, it is impossible
to say that the members of a legislature have had any intention, in
the sense of a construction placed upon the language of a statute,
with respect to issues raised by the existence or occurrence of objects, events or other circumstances which were not in existence at
the time of the enactment.62 The case of Raburn v. Nash"a had to
deal with such a situation although the decision did not rest on the
60. Since consolidation is effectuated primarily for economic reasons, economies of
scale might often be the result thus requiring a reduction in the teaching staff.
61. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
62. See discussion of new applications of old enactments in Hart & Sacks, supra
note 1, at 1203-17.
63. 78 N.M. 385, 431 P.2d 874 (1967).
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determination of that issue because of the court's "even if" argument.
A criminal information had been filed on March 4, 1965, charging the appellant with forgery. After a preliminary hearing, petitioner disqualified the resident judge. Another judge was designated
to preside and trial was set for April, 1967. The petitioner sought
dismissal of the information because he had not been afforded a
speedy trial. 4
The petitioner relied in part upon a New Mexico statute which
reads: "All indictments shall be tried at the first term at which the
defendant appears, unless continued for good cause. ' 65 Petitioner
conceded that the statute does not expressly apply to defendants
informed against, as opposed to those indicted, but argued that
the legislative policy of the statute ought to be extended to place
a duty on courts to speedily bring defendant to trial.
The New Mexico court held that the statute did not apply either
directly or as a declaration of policy for two reasons. First, "the
New Mexico statute relied upon . . . was clearly not enacted with
a view to carrying into effect the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
trial. It was enacted long before New Mexico became a state and
has been carried forward into our laws without change." Second, the
statute does not apply to informations because the statute was enacted in 186566 while informations were not authorized by constitutional amendment until 1925.67
The court's first argument is correct as far as it goes. The statute
could not have been an attempt to carry out a New Mexico constitutional right because the New Mexico constitution was not in
existence at the time. The implication is, however, that the purpose
of the statute, therefore, was not directed toward speedy trials. But
what other possible purpose could be attributed to it?
The second argument, that the statute cannot apply to defendants
informed against because informations were not authorized at the
time, is equally unconvincing. The court should examine the purpose of the original enactment (speedy trial) and decide whether the
purpose is served by an interpretation that attributes to the language the particular, unforeseen change in issue. Is there any reason
64. The petitioner had also been charged in February, 1965 with escape, to which
he entered a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." A psychiatric report was ordered and received, and petitioner was convicted of escape in October, 1965. Although
it is a court policy not to allow the same jury to hear two cases against a single defend-

ant in
65.
66.
67.

the same term, that same policy would not seem to also preclude the 1966 term.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-11-4 (Repl. 1964).
N.M. Laws 1865, ch. 57, § 17.
N.M. Const. art. 2, § 14 (Amended 1923).
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to assume that the purpose of speedy trials is served by distinguishing between defendants indicted and those informed against? And
even if we assume that the statute does not directly apply, the court
ought to agree with petitioner's argument that the statute declares a
legislative policy of imposing a duty on the courts and its officers to
speedily bring petitioner to trial. The reasons for a speedy trial in
the case of indicted defendants (i.e., to guard against prolonged
imprisonment, to suppress public suspicion against the defendant
from arising because of delay, and to prevent the evidence from
going stale)1 8 are no less important to defendants who have been
informed against.
Thus, the court in Raburn v. Nash failed to consider the problems of new applications of old enactments because no thought was
given to purpose." There seems to be no criteria for determining
which cases require inquiries into purpose and which do not. In State
v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc. 70 the court was reluctant to look at purpose
and thereby reached the wrong result. The criminal statute involved
reads:
It is unlawful for any merchant to advertise or offer for sale any
item of merchandise with a limitation upon the number of such items
which any purchaser may purchase at the advertised price. It is further
unlawful for any merchant offering or advertising any such item of
merchandise in his place of business at any given price to refuse to sell
to any prospective purchaser for cash the whole or any part of his
71
stock of such items at such price.

The defendant was charged under the first sentence of the

statute for advertising to sell "Swift's Butterball Broad Breasted
Hen Turkeys" for 33 cents per pound for the first turkey and 39
cents per pound for all additional turkeys. A similar advertisement
appeared with regard to the sale of Coca-Cola. 72 The question before the court was whether the advertisement limited the number of
turkeys (or cokes) that could be bought "at the advertised price."
The court held that it did not:
68. These policies are set out in the case.
69. In addition to the court's "even if" argument relating to petitioner's contribution to the delay, the court also stated: "Furthermore, the statute relied upon, unlike
those requiring dismissal for failure to bring to trial within the prescribed period, is
only directory." Why the court would not feel obligated to follow the statute when it
applies is not indicated in the opinion.
70. 74 N.M. 55, 390 P.2d 437 (1964).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. §49-1-5 (Repl. 1966). The criminal penalty for violation is
provided in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 49-1-6 (Repl. 1966).
72. The store advertised to sell two cartons of king-size Coke for 29 cents each,
additional cartons for 39 cents.
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A cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature as it is expressed in the words
of the statute. And Penal statutes must be strictly interpreted with
respect to the offense ...
Applying these rules of construction, it becomes apparent that the
advertised price was one or two items at one price and additional
items at a higher price. The informations charged neither a limitation
upon the number of items which any purchaser might buy at the
advertised price nor a refusal to sell to any prospective purchaser the
whole or any part of such items of merchandise at the advertised
78
price.

The court has "applied" its rules of construction and determined
that a consolidation of the two advertised prices equals "at the advertised price" and since no limit is placed on purchases at the higher
price the statute has not been violated.
The point is that the rules of construction used by the court have
made nothing "apparent. ' 74 What purpose ought to be attributed
to the statute? If its purpose is not to discourage loss leader advertising and sales, it is difficult to ascertain what else is sought to be
remedied.7 5 Of course, it is not aimed merely at the advertising and
sales of goods in limited quantities at below-cost prices, but at any
such practices at prices substantially below the market price. This
kind of strategy is called loss-leader selling because the seller takes
a loss on the particular item in order to bring in more customers to
buy other goods at the regular prices. When the dust has settled he
expects to make an overall profit that he would not have made without the loss-leader. Rightly or wrongly this practice is discouraged
by prohibiting limits being placed on quantity in order to protect
the small businesses and eventually the consumer.
This purpose of discouraging loss-leaders is certainly not being
carried out if the statute is held not to apply to defendant's practices.
Defendant was certainly limiting the number of turkeys that could
be purchased by a particular consumer at the advertised price of 33
cents. This is only slightly different from advertising a good at a
low price and placing a limit on quantity without mentioning that
7
quantities above that number may be purchased at the regular priced.
73. State v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 74 N.M. 55, 57, 390 P.2d 437, 438 (1964)
(citations omitted).
74. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
75. The state argued that the statute was enacted as a deterrent to loss-leader
practices.
76. The court could conceivably hold this set of facts as not prohibited by the
statute, reasoning that the limit implies that the buyer may purchase more at the
regular price, thus analogizing this case to Shop Rite.
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Thus, if the seller is willing to part with his stock at the regular
price the statute and its purpose can be completely avoided by virtue
of the court's opinion.
The words of the statute will bear the application of it to the defendant. The only question is whether giving the words this meaning
will violate any policy of clear statement. Statutes defining criminal
conduct ought to speak with more than ordinary clearness, but is not
the practice of defendant clearly within the words of the statute,
i.e., advertising a price (33 cents) and limiting the number (1) that
may be purchased at that price? Moreover, the statute is not directed
to people generally but to merchants who are likely to be aware of
its existence. Could the defendant have possibly thought that his
advertisement did not violate the statute?
The court in Shop Rite ignored purpose in favor of rules of construction. What mysterious technique of interpretation did it use to
determine that the defendant was not within the scope of the statute?
The answer would be of great help to the New Mexico attorney.
The only advice the opinion gives him is to concentrate on meaningless "rules" of construction and hope that the court's esoteric statutory approach will work out in his favor. The best advice would
be for him to waive oral argument, if it were not for the cases that
attempt to discover purpose and thus keep him guessing. In State
v. Vigi 7 7 the New Mexico Supreme Court used a purpose argument
to construe the word "publish" in a notice statute.
The case involved the village of Espanola and two newspapers.
The village sits on the border between Rio Arriba County and Santa
Fe County. For some time prior to April, 1963, the village had published all of its legal notices in both the New Mexican, a daily
printed in Santa Fe, and the Rio Grande Sun, a weekly printed in
the Rio Arriba County side of Espanola. Both newspapers are of
general circulation in all of Espanola and each has a second class
postal permit in the county in which it is printed, but neither has
one in the county of the other. Sometime after April, 1963, the
Espanola village council decided to publish all future ordinances and
legal notices only in the New Mexican. The Rio Grande Sun brought
suit to compel the council to publish in its newspaper. The primary
statute reads as follows:
All ordinances .. .and all by-laws of a general or permanent
nature, and those imposing any fine, penalty or forfeiture, shall be
published in some newspaper of general circulation in the municipal
corporation, and it shall be deemed a sufficient defense to any suit or
77. 74 N.M. 766, 398 P.2d 987 (1965).
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prosecution . ..to show that no such publication was made: Provided, however, that if no such newspaper is published within the
limits of the corporation, then, and in that case, such by-laws may be
published by posting copies thereof in three (3) public places, within
the limits of the corporation ....78
In order to discover the definition of a legal newspaper the court

had to consult another New Mexico statute, 7 which reads in part:
Any and every legal notice or advertisement shall be published only
in a daily, a triweekly, a semi-weekly or a weekly newspaper of general
paid circulation, which is entered under the second class postal privilege in the county in which said notice or advertisement is required
to be published ....80

The New Mexican argued that the word "published," which is
italicized in the first section, means to give notice by advertising in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality regardless of
where it is physically printed. The Rio Grande Sun, on the other
hand, insisted that the word "published" is synonymous with the
word "printed." The trial court, guided by the second class postal
privilege requirement in the second section, required that legal
notices be published in both papers since neither had the privilege
in the other's county.
The supreme court answered the Rio Grande Sun's argument that
"publish" means "print" mainly by a purpose argument: "the aim
of a statute requiring legal publication is so that the contents of the
notice may be brought home to the public generally.""' The court
reasoned that the word "publish," therefore, does not mean print.
To reach its conclusion about purpose, however, the court relied
mainly upon cases from other states. Thus, the court seemed to be
transferring the determination of purpose of other state courts concerning their differently worded statutes to the New Mexico enact-

ment. It is difficult to understand how those decisions are relevant to
the New Mexico provision. Even if the New Mexico provisions
were identical to that of another state, several other variables might
preclude the other state court's interpretation. Why is the New
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-25-7 (1953) (emphasis added).
79. In deciding whether to consult this second statute the court resorted to the
pari materia doctrine, which the court declared is used only in the case of ambiguity.
It would seem, however, that whether to use another statute to aid in the interpretation
of the statute in question is an initial question which ought to be answered on the basis
of materiality, not ambiguity.
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-2-2 (Repl. 1966).
81. State v. Vigil, 74 N.M. 766, 772, 398 P.2d 987, 991 (1965).
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Mexico court unable to make a confident, independent determination
of what purpose ought to be attributed to the New Mexico statute ?82
The analysis should go something like this: Since the purpose of
the New Mexico provision is to serve notice of city ordinances the
term "publish" ought to be given a meaning that will best carry out
that purpose. The effective notice of a publication depends largely
upon its circulation, not upon the actual location of its printing press.
To require that a newspaper be actually printed in a locality may
serve to defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to give notice.
The court partially abandoned the purpose approach when it considered the issue of whether the second class postal privilege requirement of the second statute required legal notices to be placed in both
newspapers. The court's argument was that that requirement was
only directory, not mandatory,13 and that "such a literal application
of § 10-2-2, supra, to the factual situation present herein would defeat the purpose of the legislature in § 14-25-7," which is designed
to give notice. The court made this diagnosis without considering
the purpose of the particular requirement.
Why would a reasonable legislature, after providing for the requirement of general circulation also require that the newspaper
have its second class postal privilege in the county in which the notice
is required to be published? The reason seems to be to further the
cause of notice. Since the privilege is entered where the business of
the publication is transacted during the usual business hours, the
paper is likely to have more local news and therefore better interest
and better circulation in the locality. The notice is thus likely to be
more effective. Of course, certain kinds of situations could result in
that requirement defeating the purpose of notice, but it remains
84
nonetheless.
Applying the requirement to the present situation would seem to
compel publication in both papers because the purpose of notice
would be furthered. After all, publication in two newspapers of general circulation is likely to afford more notice than publication in
only one. However, as the court said, "The purpose of publication
82. Decisions from other states might best be used as devices for checking a particular result.
83. See note 69 supra.
84. In such situations the question becomes: To what extent can specific statutory
language be ignored in order to further the overall purpose of the statute? See Wiggins v. Lopez, 73 N.M. 224, 387 P.2d 330 (1963). Statute required notice of bond election
to be posted in 5 conspicuous places and be published in a newspaper in a certain
form. School board posted 5 notices correctly, sent a personal notice to each boxholder
in the district (not required), but did not publish notice in the newspaper as directed.
Instead, a news story appeared in the paper containing all the information as required
by the statute for formal notice. Held, notice not given as required by statute.
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statutes is to give notice to the citizens, not to double the cost of
publication. . .. ,,8' Besides, why should a town or village be required to publish in two newspapers just because it lies in two counties, when the legislature considers one to be sufficient in the case of
towns wholly within one county? While the legislature is unlikely
to have considered an Espanola situation, the court should not, and
did not, apply the statute inconsistently so as to burden certain
uniquely situated towns. 6
In light of the foregoing analysis of the New Mexico cases, what
general criticisms can be made of the supreme court's methods of
statutory interpretation? Some decisions were correct and were
arrived at with an approach not entirely unlike that advocated by
Hart and Sacks. Others were correct but used reasoning which has
been criticized by this Note. Still others reached the wrong result
because of the method used. So what? No court can be right all the
time. And why is the reasoning so important so long as the correct
result is reached ?
Ours is a society composed of individuals all striving to attain
their wants and desires. Each person, however, cannot be allowed to
maximize his goals at the expense of his fellows. Each is allowed to
pursue his goals consistent with the rights and similar pursuit of
others. It is thought that the individual pursuit of happiness actually
serves to maximize the goals and satisfactions obtained by society
as a whole. This interdependence of people, however, requires the
kind of rules of order which will advance this system.
The rules are not necessarily complete. The common law evolves
as conflicts between people occur and are brought before the judiciary. The formal rules in the form of legislative acts undergo
clarification and refinement as they are interpreted by the courts in
the light of specific and novel controversies. The court's role is an
important one, and its usefulness is evaluated according to its ability
to decide controversies justly and according to reasoning that is acceptable and convincing. With regard to statutory interpretation
it is the court's duty not only to carry out the legislative will with
regard to the parties directly concerned, but to arrive at its decision
by reasoning that is convincing and is calculated to serve as a guide
to future conduct by everyone so that similar conflicts and uncer85. State v. Vigil, 74 N.M. 766, 773, 398 P.2d 987, 992 (1965).
86. The argument could be made that by reading the two provisions together,
the New Mexican is optional while the Rio Grande Sun is required, i.e., the newspaper
must be of general circulation and printed within the municipality, and an out-of-city
newspaper cannot be substituted. In this regard the number of times each newspaper
appears might be determinative. Thus, the New Mexican could be substituted because it
is a daily while the Rio Grande Sun is a weekly.
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tainty may be avoided. This is the importance of the written opinion;
we are not only concerned with the litigants, but also with the value
that experience and precedent can have for the rest of society.
The need for strong, well reasoned and consistent opinions, therefore, is obvious. The wrong result reached by unconvincing reasoning dearly disappoints not only one of the parties to the action, but
also non-parties. This does nothing to promote public confidence in
the judiciary, which is a necessity if courts are to function as effective
problem solvers. The court's function is to discourage litigation by
the use of well reasoned decisions that can be relied upon, are just
and acceptable to the public, and indicate the kind of future conduct which will avoid similar problems and conflicts. The court's
function is not to discourage litigation because of a lack of predictability on the part of potential litigants or because of a lack of faith
in the court's ability to decide controversies justly.
Correct results based upon obscure or faulty reasoning also fail
to contribute to public confidence or predictability. The losing party
is unconvinced and disillusioned, attorneys find it difficult to advise
conduct or litigation, and the public is not satisfied by the result nor
confident about the kind of conduct that can avoid similar conflicts.
Consider in this regard the value of canons of construction, conclusions without reasoning, and the improper use of other cases or
statutes.
Convincing decisions which employ reasoning calculated to reach
the correct result and to prescribe future conduct on the part of
litigants and non-litigants alike should be the goal of the court. And
because statutes are purposive acts, what better way to attain this
goal than to develop and consistently apply an approach to statutory
construction that is designed to discover legislative purpose and
carry out that purpose consistent with the language used and with
any established policy of clear statement?
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